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1.0   Introduction 
 
 There exists an extensive literature, spanning multiple disciplines, focusing on 
strategic alliances.  Researchers have explored, for example, why firms engage in 
alliances; how partners are chosen; what types of alliances are entered; how alliance 
portfolios are built; the impact on innovation and new product development; and whether 
alliances create value for shareholders.  Often overlooked, however, in these literatures 
are the structure and influences of the underlying contracts that control these 
relationships.  By overlooking these contracts, the complexity of the agreement and as a 
result, the complexity of the fundamental relationship is ignored.  Furthermore, the 
structure of these contracts dictates the allocation of control rights which affect a 
multitude of items ranging from intellectual property rights to marketing, manufacturing 
and distribution.  Research suggests that it is how these control rights are allocated 
determines how a firm will benefit from a research relationship (Adegbesan and Ricart, 
2005).   
Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) scholars argue that contracts will be more 
“complex” as more contractual safeguards are written into them in order to mitigate 
potential exchange hazards (Williamson, 1985, 1991).  Likewise, when potential 
exchange hazards are low complex contracts are not needed and simpler, more routine 
ones are sufficient (Joskow, 1987).  In addition to the complexity of the contract, the 
underlying provisions that deal with the actual allocation of specific control rights are 
also important since they determine how a firm benefits from the relationship. While 
several papers have directly studied the allocation of control rights (Lerner et al, 2003; 
Lerner and Merges, 1998; Elfenbein and Lerner, 2003; Lerner and Malmendier, 2004; 
Higgins, 2007; Adegbesan and Higgins, 2007) we are not aware of any research that 
explores the direct relationship between contractual complexity and the allocation of 
control rights in technology sourcing agreements.  We attempt to fill this important gap 
by bridging together these two literatures through the analysis of strategic alliance 
agreements between pharmaceutical and biotechnology firms.      
 We make several contributions to the literature.  First, we extend the literature on 
contractual complexity by modeling complexity in a multi-dimensional framework.   This 
framework allows us to focus on both the functional scope and the technological scope of 
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an agreement.  Functional scope provides us with a measure of the breadth of an alliance 
while technological scope provides us with a measure of the depth of an alliance.  We 
measure functional scope based on specific contractual provisions, which is not 
uncommon in the literature (e.g., Ryall and Sampson, 2006; Reuer and Arino, 2007).  
However, in order to measure technological scope we explicitly control for and model the 
underlying focal technology(s) in the alliance relationship.   
 Second, within our framework, we analyze the determinants that increase the 
probability that an alliance agreement will be more complex.  One of the most significant 
factors that increase the complexity of an agreement is the phase of the focal product at 
the time of signing.  Alliances whose focal products are in later stages of development 
tend to focus on one technology and this simplicity is reflected in the underlying contract 
structure.  Additionally, the age and prevalence of the focal technology are important.  
The newest technologies and ones that are the least prevalent in the population of 
alliances increase the probability of more complex agreements.  New and less prevalent 
technologies can be viewed as more risky and as a result more complex agreements are 
written to protect the parties. 
 Third, we tie the contractual complexity literature to the control rights literature 
by analyzing the relationship between contract structure and the allocation Of control 
rights.  All of the extant literature focusing on control rights ignores the underlying 
structure of the actual agreement.1  In addition, we follow Higgins (2007) and control for 
the relative bargaining position of both the pharmaceutical and biotechnology firm.  We 
find that of the two dimensions of contractual complexity we propose, functional scope 
has a negative and significant impact on the number of rights allocated to the 
pharmaceutical firm.  We argue that this suggests pharmaceutical companies are able to 
“bargain” or “trade” some sets of control rights for other sets of rights.    
 Fourth, we find that as a firm’s stock of alliances increases or if they have had 
prior relationships with a partner contracts tend, on average, to be less complex.  This 
finding contrasts with Ryall and Sampson (2006) who find that contracts are more 
detailed when firms have prior relationships.  However, Ciccotello and Hornyak (2000), 
                                                 
1   See, for example, Lerner et al, 2003; Lerner and Merges, 1998; Elfenbein and Lerner, 2003; Lerner and 
Malmendier, 2004; Higgins, 2007; Adegbesan and Higgins, 2007. 
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Parke (1993) and Gulati (1995) find some evidence of reduced contractual safeguards 
between firms engaging in repeated contacts.  They attribute their findings to increased 
levels of trust.  Indeed, there is a literature dealing with relational norms, such as trust, 
that view these types of activities as substitutes for complex contractual agreements 
(Granovetter, 1985; Bernheim and Whinston, 1998; Bradach and Eccles, 1989; Dyer and 
Singh, 1998; Gulati, 1995; Uzzi, 1997; Adler, 2001).2  Our focus on the 
biopharmaceutical industry makes these findings even more interesting given average 
product development cycles of 10 to 15 years (DiMasi, 2001).  Given this time frame, the 
risk and uncertainty involved, along with potential significant payoffs, one might expect 
to see more complex agreements in order for firms to protect themselves, however, we 
see the opposite.       
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 discusses our 
framework for contractual complexity and control rights; Section 3 discusses our data and 
sample construction; Section 4 presents and discusses our empirical finding; Section 5 
discusses and presents robustness results; and, Section 6 summarizes the analysis and 
discusses the next evolution of this research. 
 
 
2.0  Contractual complexity and the allocation of control rights 
 
Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) scholars generally define “contractual 
complexity” in terms of the increased number of contractual safeguards written into 
contracts in order to mitigate potential exchange hazards.  Broadly, three types of 
exchange hazards are defined that necessitate the need for contractual complexity: asset 
specificity, measurement difficulty and errors, and uncertainty (Williamson, 1985, 1991).  
Uncertainty is considered as an exchange hazard specifically when asset specificity is 
present in a relationship.  According to TCE theory, more contractual safeguards will be 
needed as the risk of opportunistic behavior increases due to one or more of these 
exchange hazards.  In contrast, when the likelihood of exchange hazards is low, the 
associated costs of complex contracts are not necessary and relatively simple ones are 
                                                 
2  Poppo and Zenger (2002) extend this literature by arguing that relational norms can be viewed as 
complements to complex contractual arraignments.  In a recent research, Gulati and Nickerson (2007) find 
evidence that preexisting inter-organizational trust increases the probability of choosing a less formal and  
less costly mode to relationships. 
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sufficient (Joskow, 1987).  Several empirical studies support these predicted relationships 
(Joskow, 1988; Pisano, 1989; Oxley, 1997).3   
The extant empirical research on strategic alliances which focuses on contractual 
safeguards within TCE generally address the question of when or under what 
circumstances firms choose one type of alliance over another.  This type of research 
usually puts alliances into broad categories (such as non-equity vs. equity; and, alliance 
or acquisition activity) and finds that a higher likelihood of exchange hazards results in 
more hierarchical contractual agreements since these agreements provide more control 
and shared ownership (Oxley, 1997; Sampson, 2004).   Many of the studies which focus 
on the contractual complexity of alliance agreements overlook the underlying provisions 
that are included in contracts.4  
 In addition, analyzing the complexity of contracts alone ignores the underlying 
allocation of specific control rights.  It is the underlying allocation of these rights, 
regardless of the complexity of the contract that will help determine how a firm will 
benefit from the research relationship.  For example, Adegbesan and Ricart (2005) find 
that innovation might not significantly improve a firm’s performance if value is 
asymmetrically appropriated by one of the parties to the agreement.  Notwithstanding 
prior contributions there exists no research that explores the direct relationship between 
contractual complexity and the underlying allocation of control rights in an alliance or 
technology sourcing agreement.   
  
2.1 Contractual complexity 
 
The notion of contractual complexity has been studied elsewhere in the literature 
(e.g., Reuer and Arino, 2007; Robinson and Stuart, 2007; Barthelemy and Quelin, 2006; 
Ryall and Sampson, 2006; Oxley and Sampson, 2004; Luo, 2002; and, Poppo and 
Zenger, 2002; Joskow, 1988).  However, these studies differ widely in their approach and 
                                                 
3  A competing literature dealing with relational norms, such as trust, views these types of activities as 
substitutes for complex contractual agreements (Granovetter, 1985; Bernheim and Whinston, 1998; 
Bradach and Eccles, 1989; Dyer and Singh, 1998; Gulati, 1995; Uzzi, 1997; Adler, 2001.  Poppo and 
Zenger (2002) contribute to this stream of literature by arguing that relational governance act as 
complements and not substitutes to complex contractual relationships.  We will directly address this stream 
of research throughout our paper.  
4   A notable exception is Reuer and Arino (2007). 
 6
definition of complexity.  For example, some use broad measures such as contract length 
or number of provisions (Robinson and Stuart, 2007; Joskow, 1988) and others focus on 
inclusion or exclusion of specific provisions (Barthelemy and Quelin, 2006).  Barthelemy 
and Quelin (2006) examine the link between three types of asset specificity and 
contractual complexity.  They define contractual complexity by the extent to which 
contracts are comprised of “elaborate clauses”.5  Ryall and Sampson (2006) examine 
telecommunication alliance contracts and find that prior alliances, in general and with a 
specific partner, have an effect on contractual structure.  Contractual completeness in 
their study refers “…to the degree to which required inputs, expected outputs and 
division of intellectual property rights are fully specified” (p.12, 2003).  Poppo and 
Zenger (2002) focus on the complementary relationship between formal contacts and 
relational governance.  Their focus is on the information systems industry and contractual 
complexity is defined based on a survey asking about the customization and extent of 
legal work the contracts required.6  In a more recent study, Reuer and Arino (2007) 
examine the determinants and dimensions of contractual complexity focusing on 
weighted and un-weighted measures of eight classes of contractual safeguard provisions 
originally developed in a study by Parkhe (1993). They include “enforcement provisions” 
such as confidentiality, termination, arbitration and lawsuit clauses and “coordination 
provisions” such as notification and auditing rights.7  
In contrast to this body of work, we define contractual complexity along a 
multidimensional framework: functional scope and technological scope.  Functional 
scope provides us with a measure of the breadth of an alliance contract while 
technological scope provides us with a measure of the depth of an alliance contract.  We 
argue that our multidimensional focus on complexity is a better way to measure 
contractual complexity in technology sourcing agreements.  Broad measures such as 
                                                 
5   Where “elaborate clauses” are comprised across different types of clauses including control, incentive, 
price, evolution, and end of contract. 
6   Poppo and Zenger (2002) is a pivotal study in the stream of research dealing with relational governance.  
Prior work (including Granovetter, 1985; Bernheim and Whinston, 1998; Bradach and Eccles, 1989; Dyer 
and Singh, 1998; Gulati, 1995; Uzzi, 1997; Adler, 2001) focused on substitutability between relations and 
complex contracts.  Poppo and Zenger (2002) argue that these types of relationships are in fact 
complementary with complex contracts as opposed to substitutes. 
7   Similarly, Lerner and Malmendier (2004) study the allocation of termination and exit rights and their use 
in helping firms mitigate moral hazard issues. 
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contract length and the number of provisions included in a contract do not consistently 
define contractual complexity across heterogeneous contractual relationships and 
focusing only on certain provisions may be too limited and ignore other relevant aspects 
of contractual design (Reuer and Arino, 2007).  Our definition of contractual complexity 
(discussed in more detail in Section 3.2), on the other hand, is a measure of the activities 
and technologies chosen to be included in an alliance, which is subsequently then 
specified in a contract.  More specifically, functional scope identifies the extent of value 
chain activities, such as manufacturing, marketing and distribution that alliance partners 
choose to include in technology sourcing agreements.  This measure of the breadth of 
technology sourcing agreement is similar to the alliance scope definition in Oxley and 
Sampson (2004).8  
Another dimension of the scope of an alliance is the level of technological 
complexity.  Technological complexity, especially in research-intensive alliances, is 
particularly relevant since it relates to firm capabilities and the overall uncertainty of the 
focal projects.  We argue that in technology sourcing agreements another dimension of 
contractual complexity is based on technology scope.  Technology scope or the number 
of technologies that are specified in an alliance defines the depth dimension of 
contractual complexity.9 10  The greater the scope of an alliance is in either dimension, 
the more interdependent and extensive it will be.  As a result, an increase in either the 
breadth or depth of an alliance will increase the expected collaborative intricacy of the 
relationship and thus contractual complexity. 
When a project is more complex and a greater number of alliance activities are 
jointly completed, then TCE predicts that the risk for exchange hazards, such as potential 
opportunistic behavior and leakage of knowledge, may be greater (Williamson, 1985, 
                                                 
8   Heiman and Nickerson (2004) study the tension between the need to share knowledge and the need to 
safeguard against uncontracted for expropriation of knowledge.  In analyzing publicly announced alliances 
from 1977 to 1989 they construct a measure of tacit knowledge that is similar to our notion of breadth. 
9  Theoretical conceptualization of technology scope (Khanna, 1998 and Khanna, Gulati and Nohria, 1998) 
and empirical analysis by Oxley and Sampson (2004) acknowledge that alliance scope is a 
multidimensional measure but to our knowledge this is the first empirical paper to construct such a 
multidimensional measure.   
10  Oxley and Sampson (2004) argue that functional scope is a “vertical” scope measure and “horizontal” 
activities, which they do not include in their analysis, are related to uncertainty and complexity of the 
alliance project.  In our definition, technology scope, which defines the technological complexity of a 
project, is a depth or a vertical measure. 
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1991).  Prior research mainly focusing on the governance choice decision, demonstrates 
that hierarchical governance forms (e.g., equity joint venture) are more likely to be 
adopted when the alliance scope is greater.  Alliance scope in these studies is determined 
by the inclusion of functional activities or the number of projects involved in an alliance 
(Pisano, 1989; Oxley, 1997).  An important exception to this is the research by Oxley and 
Sampson (2004) where the determinants of alliance scope are explicitly analyzed. 
In the extant literature the concepts of complexity and uncertainty are often used 
interchangeably.  This creates problems in the empirical examination of the effects of 
uncertainty on the governance modes of transactional relationships (Slater and Spencer, 
2000).11  In our analysis, we specifically examine how technology characteristics, which 
define the level of technological uncertainty in an R&D agreement, affect the depth of 
alliance scope and thus contractual complexity.  In collaborative R&D alliances, contract 
specification is difficult since technological know-how is highly tacit (Mowery and 
Rosenberg, 1989).  For newer and less known technologies, contract specification is 
expected to be even more challenging than those alliances with older, more established 
technologies since the level of tacitness in technological know-how is greater (Davidson 
and McFetridge, 1984).  To facilitate R&D collaboration and increase the effectiveness of 
technological communication, partner companies may choose to technologically broaden 
the scope of an alliance to include other related technologies in addition to the novel 
technology or the novel aspect of technology that is of main interest.  Thus, companies 
that chose to engage in projects using highly uncertain and novel technologies may also 
chose to increase the depth or the technological detail of their R&D collaboration.  
Similarly, those technologies that are either new or old but less prevalently used are also 
                                                 
11  The treatment of uncertainty in empirical research is not consistent for other reasons as well.  Most 
importantly, there are many different types of uncertainty.  Primary uncertainty is about the lack of 
knowledge about the state of nature and it includes some constructs of environmental uncertainty such as 
regulatory changes and technological uncertainty.  Secondary uncertainty is about the lack of understanding 
of other economic agents and generally arises from lack of communication or the inability to assess other 
party’s plans and actions.  Behavioral uncertainty, as defined by (Williamson (1975, 1981), arises from 
strategic actions of contracting parties such as deliberate non-disclosure or purposeful misrepresentation. 
Another explanation for the ambiguity in empirical examination of uncertainty is that the TCE prediction of 
more hierarchical governance under uncertainty only holds when relationship specific investment or asset 
specificity is present in a contractual relationship (Klein, 1990).  Since our analysis includes R&D 
alliances, we contend that relationship specific investment is present in every contractual agreement in our 
dataset.  In addition, we are very careful in defining technological complexity and technological uncertainty 
in our analysis. 
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likely to be more uncertain, and thus require technologically deeper, more detailed 
contracts.   
 
2.2 Allocation of control rights 
 
  
In addition to analyzing the breadth and depth of a contract we go one step further 
and delve into the actual contracts to study the allocation of control rights and the 
relationship between that allocation and complexity.  Regardless of how the underlying 
contracts are structured and what terms are included, it is how the individual rights are 
allocated that will determine how a party will benefit from the agreement.  We address 
this issue next.     
 Since the seminal work of Coase (1937), economic research has considered the 
boundaries of the firm.  Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1988) consider 
the issue of incomplete contracting between principal and agent.  Here two parties are 
unable to draft a contract that is capable of covering all potential contingencies that may 
arise during their relationship.  As a result, they suggest optimal ownership of a project 
should be assigned to the party with the greatest marginal ability to impact the final 
outcome.  This party should be the one who retains the right to make decisions not 
explicitly specified by contract.  Consequently, they should also be the firm that receives 
any and all of the surplus rents generated by a given project.  This allocation of rights 
should provide an incentive to the firm to function in a manner which will optimize 
returns from the project and, in turn, maximize their own potential surplus.  
Aghion and Tirole (1994) utilize the Grossman-Hart framework to model a 
research and development alliance between two firms.  They begin by assuming that 
research-intensive firms are without financial resources of their own and are restricted 
from being able to borrow money or commercialize their own innovations.  As a 
consequence, the research-intensive firm will turn to a “customer” for alliance financing.  
The “customer” in this framework is the party who will directly benefit from the 
innovation.  The customer is assumed to be unable to independently develop the research-
intensive firm’s innovation.  Aghion and Tirole posit that the bargaining position of the 
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two firms will have an impact on the subsequent allocation of control rights for the 
innovation.   
Lerner and Merges (1998), Lerner et al (2003), Higgins (2007) and Adegbesan 
and Higgins (2007) empirically test the above theoretical prescriptions by exploring the 
role that the availability of public financing has on the bargaining power of the research-
intensive firm and the subsequent allocation of control rights.  Aghion and Tirole (1994) 
do not explicitly discuss the role of public financing.  However, Lerner et al (2003), 
claim “…it is reasonable to believe that variations in the availability of public financing 
will affect the bargaining power of R&D firms.”  This is supported by Aghion and Bolton 
(1992) and Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) who find strong links between the transfer of 
control rights and the conditions of public equity markets, in terms of the availability of 
public financing.      
Within the framework of Aghion and Tirole (1994), Lerner and Merges (1998) 
find that the number of control rights allocated to the biotechnology firm is an increasing 
function of both the firm’s financial health and the presence of favorable conditions in the 
marketplace.  Biotechnology firms with more revenues in the year prior to the alliance 
agreement were less likely to negotiate away their control rights.  The presence of 
revenues serves as an indication that the firm was negotiating from a position of relative 
strength.  This finding is consistent with prior theoretical predictions.   
Lerner et al (2003) and Higgins (2007) explore whether alliance financing 
agreements provide for different allocation of control rights between periods of varying 
availability of public financing.  Theory suggests that agreements signed in periods with 
limited availability of external financing will be less likely to maximize innovative 
output.  Lerner et al (2003) and Higgins (2007) find that in periods of limited availability 
of public financing, smaller biotechnology firms seek out larger pharmaceutical firms for 
alliance financing.  In these agreements, biotechnology firms are in fact more likely to 
cede a greater number of control rights to the financing (pharmaceutical) firm.   
 Dessein (2005) develops a theory of the structure of alliances between an investor 
firm and an entrepreneur.  His model is based upon asymmetric information driving the 
main underlying motivation behind the allocation of control rights.  He finds that even a 
small amount of asymmetric information will cause the entrepreneur to relinquish a 
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substantial amount of control to the investor in an effort to signal his congruence.  He 
also finds that the relinquishing of control is an increasing function of the level of 
informational asymmetries and a decreasing function in the resources of the entrepreneur.  
This result implies that early stage projects, where the information asymmetries are the 
largest, will be where the most rights are given up.  While this finding is consistent with 
Lerner and Merges (1998), it is inconsistent with prior theoretical predictions. 
Aghion and Tirole (1994) consider the bargaining positions of both firms, while 
the empirical work by Lerner et al (1998, 2003) focuses on the bargaining position of the 
smaller research-intensive firm, in terms of their ability to access public equity markets.  
These studies allow the overall health of the larger customer firm to remain fairly static.12  
As a result, the bargaining position of the customer firm is excluded from the analysis.  
On the other hand, Elfenbein and Lerner (2003), Higgins (2007) and Adegbesan and 
Higgins (2007) endeavor to account for the bargaining position of both firms.  While 
bargaining position of the two firms is measured slightly differently across these studies, 
all three of these studies find evidence that the allocation control rights studied are 
sensitive to the underlying relative bargaining position of the two parties.   
 The impact of contractual complexity, however defined, on the underlying 
allocation of control rights has not been addressed in the literature.  Our study sets out to 
fill this gap in the literature.  Not only do we extend the contractual complexity literature 
by analyzing complexity within a multidimensional framework but we also study whether 
this complexity matters for the allocation of control rights.  Control rights clearly matter 
to firms.  It is how these rights are allocated that will dictate how, for example, the firm 
will benefit from future financial rewards (Adegbasen and Higgins, 2007).  Moreover, the 
use of control rights can be used to help mitigate moral hazard issues inherent in these 
types of agreements (Lerner and Malemendier, 2003).  The interplay between contractual 
complexity and control rights will tell us whether firms are able to gain (or lose) by 
entering more (or less) complex agreements. 
                                                 
12  These studies also implicitly assume that the smaller biotechnology firm is captive to one customer.  
However, on average, from 1994 to 2001, biotechnology firms had, on average, six alliance partnerships 
with other large pharmaceutical companies.  This would seem to suggest that a large pharmaceutical 
partner should be unable to demand excessive rents or control rights for fear that the biotechnology firm 
would seek out another partner.  In the above referenced works, the pharmaceutical firm or customer is 
assumed to be unable to independently develop the innovation in question.  The loss of such a 
technological innovation could place the pharmaceutical firm at a competitive disadvantage.   
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3.0  Data and sample 
 
 
We study technology sourcing agreements (alliances) between biotechnology 
firms and larger pharmaceutical manufacturers.  Data for this paper is drawn from 
multiple sources including Recombinant Capital (rDNA and ReCapRx), BioScan, FDA 
Orange Book, IMS Health, Thomson Derwent, NDA Pipeline, Pharmaprojects and 
Compustat. 
 
 3.1  Alliances and determination of control rights  
 
 Alliance information is obtained from Recombinant Capital, a California-based 
biotechnology consulting firm.  Their data identifies alliances in the biopharmaceutical 
industry from 1973 up to the present.  It provides both a general description as to the 
nature of the alliance along with detailed analyses of some of the actual alliance 
contracts.  From this data we randomly selected 240 alliances involving just two parties 
(a pharmaceutical and biotechnology firm), whose main focus is on research and 
development and has a detailed contract analysis available.  We restrict our sample to 
alliances involving just two firms in order to be able to clearly identify the allocation of 
control rights.   
 Not every alliance identified in the Recombinant Capital database has a detailed 
contract analysis associated with it.  The choice of which contracts to analyze by 
Recombinant Capital may not be a random phenomenon.  The non-randomness of this 
choice may very well introduce a selection bias into the sample; however the direction 
and magnitude of a potential bias remains unclear.  As a result, the potential presence of 
underlying variables which could strongly impact the chance for inclusion into the 
analysis process warrants the use of a Heckman selection model (Greene, 2003).  The 
dependent variable in the regression equation is Total rights, the total number of control 
rights allocated to the pharmaceutical firm.  The independent variables for the regression 
equation are the same as those that will be used in subsequent analyses and will be 
discussed below.  In no cases are any of the selection equation variables significant at 
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least at the 10% level.  Moreover, in every case the reported χ2 test, which is equivalent 
to testing for ρ =0 (where ρ is the correlation between the error terms of the regression 
and selection equations), is not significantly different from zero.  As a result, since ρ is 
not significantly different from zero, standard regression techniques can be applied to the 
regression equation without concern of introducing a selectivity bias.   
 Consistent with Lerner et al (2003) and Higgins (2007) and in order to avoid 
unnecessary heterogeneity, transactions are excluded where: 
• One of the parties is a government agency or university. 
• The current alliance is a renegotiation or restatement of a previous alliance 
between the two firms. 
• There exists no research component or aspect to the alliance.   
• One firm has a controlling interest in the other firm (greater than 50%). 
 Each contract is reviewed for relevant deal information including: the date of the 
alliance, the technology and subject covered, total value of the agreement, up-front 
payments, royalty rates, equity stakes, contingent or milestone payments, and stage of the 
lead product.  Table 1 presents a description of the variables while Table 2 summarizes 
this information.  Correlations for all variables are presented in Table 3.  The average size 
of the alliances in our sample is approximately $58 million (all values are in constant 
1999 dollars).  Upfront payments are present in 83 percent of the deals and average $7.91 
million.  The median upfront payment is $5.3 million.  Running royalty payments are 
identified in 44 percent of contracts and average 24 percent of net sales.  The median 
running royalty is 15 percent of net sales.  Milestone payments of some type are present 
in 54 percent of agreements.  For the milestone contract terms that are available, for 
products at these early stages, long-term financial rewards are very significant.  
Unfortunately, the probability that a product makes it from pre-clinical testing all the way 
to approval is very small, so the odds are against the biotechnology firm collecting on the 
full value of the milestone payments.    
 Contracts are also reviewed in order to determine the allocation of control rights.  
There are a broad spectrum of control rights that can be considered ranging from 
corporate governance, alteration in the scope of the alliance, control of technologies, 
 14
disposition of patented and unpatented information and the control of clinical trials and 
subsequent manufacturing and marketing of developed products.     
Since we are concerned with research and development activities, we want to 
come up with a subset of control right rights that directly influence the R&D relationship 
between the pharmaceutical and biotechnology firms.  After consulting with 
representatives in the biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries, the following bundle 
of eight control rights are selected to be included.  Each of these eight rights is further 
sub-categorized for analysis purposes.  Three sub-categories are used: intellectual 
property rights, exit strategy, and license.     
 
 Intellectual Property Rights 
1. Ownership of patents; 
2. Control and responsibility for patent litigation process; 
3. Transfer of unpatented R&D “know-how”; 
Licensing Rights 
4. Right to sub-license; 
5. Royalty payment tie-ins; 
Exit Rights 
6. Product reversion rights upon termination; and, 
7. Changes in control; 
8. Right to terminate without cause. 
 
A forth sub-set of two additional rights were also collected for the purposes of 
identifying the functional scope of the contract (discussed in detail below).  
  
Manufacturing & Marketing Rights 
9. Control of initial manufacturing process; 
10. Marketing rights to the product;  
  
It should be noted that there are a broad spectrum of control rights that can be 
considered when analyzing alliance biopharmaceutical agreements.  The rights analyzed 
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in this paper are slightly different than the rights considered in Lerner et al (2003), 
Higgins (2007) and Adegbesan and Higgins (2007).  The differences in rights selection 
across these projects mainly revolves around the issues being studied.  For example, the 
bundle of rights utilized in Adegbesan and Higgins (2007) focus solely on those rights 
that influence the split of the future “financial pie”.  Higgins (2007) showed general 
robustness to Lerner et al’s (2003) bundle of rights for the specifications being tested.  
Our specific selection of rights generally follows Higgins (2007) and will be discussed 
more fully below.13    
 
3.2 Contractual complexity 
 
For the purposes of this paper we will define contractual complexity along two 
separate dimensions: functional scope and technological scope.  Functional scope will 
provide us with a measure of the breadth of an alliance contract while technological 
scope provides us with a measure of the depth of an alliance contract.  Fig. 1 presents our 
notion of contractual complexity in a 2 x 2 matrix.  We further divide functional and 
technological scope into low and high types.  Technological scope is deemed low if the 
alliance agreement focuses on only one technology.  In contrast, technological scope is 
deemed high if the alliance agreement focuses on more than one technology.  Obviously, 
the larger number of technologies covered, the greater the internal capabilities of the two 
firms need to be – especially for the biotechnology firm.  We define Technological scope 
as a dummy variable that equals one if the alliance contract covers more than one 
technology.  33 percent of the sample contracts fit in the high category. 
Functional scope is deemed to be low if the alliance agreement focuses solely on 
research and development and contains only focal rights described in Section 3.1.  In 
contrast, functional scope is deemed to be high if the alliance agreement includes 
provisions dealing with marketing, manufacturing and distribution.  We therefore define 
Functional scope as a dummy variable that equals one if an alliance contract contains 
                                                 
13  As a robustness check Higgins (2007) uses the same selection of rights as Lerner et al (2003).  The 
results were qualitatively consistent.  
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marketing, manufacturing or distribution provisions.  30 percent of the sample contracts 
fit in the high category. 
Referring to Fig.1, an alliance contract in the top left quadrant (L, L) is one that 
focuses only on one technology and contains no provisions with respect to marketing, 
manufacturing and distribution.  In contrast, an alliance contract in the lower right 
quadrant (H, H) is one that focuses on more than one technology and contains provisions 
for marketing, manufacturing or distribution.  For the overall sample, 42 percent of the 
alliance contracts fall into the (L, L) quadrant, 25 percent fall into the (H, L) quadrant; 28 
percent fall into the (L, H) quadrant and 5 percent fall into the (H, H) quadrant. 
 We combine these two dimensions to construct a continuum for measuring overall 
contract complexity.  We categorize contracts in the following order from simple to 
complex: (L, L), (H, L), (L, H), and (H, H).  That is we define the simplest contract (L, L) 
as one that does not include marketing, manufacturing or distribution provisions 
(Functional scope equals “L”) and covers only one technology (Technological scope 
equals “L”).  In contrast, we define the most complex contract (H, H) as one that includes 
marketing, manufacturing or distribution provisions (Functional scope equals “H”) and 
covers more than one technology (Technological scope equal “H”). 
 By reformatting the quadrants represented in Fig. 1 into a linear continuum we 
need to decide whether to order (H, L) and (L, H) in this manner or (L, H) and (H, L).  
After consulting with representatives responsible for negotiating alliance contracts from 
both the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industry, we use the former, (H, L) and (L, 
H).  There was general agreement that alliances covering more than one underlying 
technology made the overall alliance more complex than an expanded functional scope.   
 We define Complex I as a categorical variable from one to four for our four 
categories of contractual complexity.  (L, L) is assigned one while (H, H) is assigned a 
value of four.  Complex I has a mean (median) value of 1.96 (2.00) and a standard 
deviation of 0.95.  Given that our conversations with industry representatives seemed to 
indicate that technological scope may be more influential on complexity than functional 
scope, we define Complex II as a dummy variable that equals one if Complex I equals 
three (L, H) or four (H, H).  Complex II will be used for robustness purposes.     
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3.3 Technology age and prevalence 
 
From Recombinant Capital we are able to identify the focal technology(s) 
underlying each alliance.  As a result we are able to determine both the age of the focal 
technology and its prevalence.  For our purposes, age is a function of when a focal 
technology is first identified in any alliance.14  It is certainly the case that focal 
technologies may exist before their first appearance in an alliance – either physically or 
conceptually.  However in most cases detecting this type of information in a consistent 
manner is not possible.  By focusing on the appearance of a technology in a first alliance 
we are using a homogenous standard across all technologies.  We define Technology age 
as a dummy variable that equals one if the difference between the year of the contract and 
year of first appearance in the population of alliances for the focal technology is less than 
or equal to five years.15  The mean value for Technology age is 0.22 which implies that 
22 percent of the focal technologies are less than or equal to five years of age.  
Just because a technology is old does not necessarily imply that it is prevalent or 
has diffused into the industry.  We attempt to capture how prevalent a focal technology is 
by counting the number of other alliances that used the focal technology until the date of 
the sample alliance.  As such, we define Technology count as the number of alliances in 
the population of Recombinant Capital’s database within the focal technology that have 
been initiated until the sample alliance.  The mean (median) number of prior alliances in 
the population utilizing the same sample focal technology is 214.34 (120).  The simple 
correlation between Technology count and Max Years Since is 0.5483.  This suggests that 
while there is a positive correlation, simple age is not the only driving factor of a 
technology’s prevalence.        
 
3.4 Pharmaceutical research pipeline 
 
                                                 
14   We utilize Recombinant Capital’s database and limit the lower end at 1980.  This constraint is imposed 
due to data limitations in other data sources, namely the pipeline data.  Moreover, the industry itself was 
fairly new at this point, with the first round of large scale firms going IPO in the mid 1980s.  
15   As a robustness check we define a more basic variable Max Years Since to be the difference between 
the year of the contract and the year of the first alliance in the population of alliances for the focal 
technology.  Results were qualitatively consistent.  The mean (median) age of our focal technologies are 
10.20 (9) years with a standard deviation of 4.96. 
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 We follow Higgins and Rodriguez (2006) and Higgins (2007) and construct a 
weighted-value of each pharmaceutical firm’s pipeline products using data from NDA 
Pipeline, Pharmaprojects and supplemented from ReCapRx from 1989 to 2001.  This 
measure is referred to as the Score.  A relatively high Score indicates a healthy product 
pipeline versus a company with a lower value Score.  A declining Score in the years prior 
to an alliance indicates a company whose product pipeline is deteriorating.  Firms in this 
situation negotiate and bargain from a position of weakness.  Conversely, an increasing 
Score value in the years prior to an alliance would indicate that a company’s product 
pipeline is expanding and therefore they can bargain from a position of strength (Higgins, 
2007). 
  
 3.5 Financial data 
 
 Financial data for both the pharmaceutical and biotechnology firms is summarized 
in Table 2 and is obtained primarily from Compustat.  Some financial data is 
supplemented from individual firm’s filings and corporate internet sites.  Biotechnology 
initial public offering (IPO) data is obtained from Securities Data Corporation (SDC).  
Pharmaceutical firm external R&D data is collected from Recombinant Capital.    
 
 
4.0 Empirical findings 
 
4.1  Technological scope 
 
Table 4 presents probit estimates for our data regressing Technology scope on a 
series of independent variables expected to affect the probability that a pharmaceutical 
firm enters a technologically complex agreement.16  The dependent variable used in the 
regressions reported in Table 4 is an indicator variable yit, that assumes a value of one for 
a given firm i in a specific year t if that firm enters into an alliance that contains more 
than one underlying technology, and is zero otherwise.   
For independent variables we use a weighted measure of the pharmaceutical 
firm’s research pipeline in the year prior to the alliance (Score); the natural log of 
pharmaceutical firm R&D expenditures to revenues (R&D intensity); the natural log of 
                                                 
16   Results remain robust when a logit model is considered. 
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pharmaceutical firm market capitalization (Pharma market cap); the number of biotech 
employees (Bio employees); the natural log of biotechnology firm shareholder equity 
(Bio shareholder equity); an indicator if the focal alliance is the first one for the 
biotechnology firm (First alliance); the natural log of the amount of public equity raised 
in biotechnology (IPOs) in the year prior to the alliance (Bio IPO); the ratio of 
pharmaceutical firm external R&D expenditures to total R&D expenditures in the year 
prior to the alliance (R&D payout); the natural log of the total value of the alliance (Size); 
an indicator if the lead product was in late-stage clinical testing (Late stage); an indicator 
if the difference between the year of the contract and year of the first alliance in the 
population for the focal technology is less than or equal to 5 years (Technology age); the 
number of alliances in the population within the focal technology that have been initiated 
until the focal alliance (Technology count); the pharmaceutical firm stock of alliances 
(Alliance stock); and indicators that identify the presence of milestone payments 
(Milestone dummy), equity positions (Equity dummy) and royalties (Royalty dummy).  
Year dummies are included in all models.  See Table 1 for variable definitions, Table 2 
for descriptive statistics and Table 3 for variable correlations.    
 Across all four models (Model 1 to Model 4) in Table 4, we find a positive and 
significant impact of Technology age on the probability that an alliance contract covers 
more than one technology.  Marginal effects range from 0.3729 to 0.3934 and are all 
significant at the 1 percent level.  This suggests that newer technologies are often coupled 
together or combined with existing technologies in these agreements.  The effects on 
Technology count bolster this finding.  The negative coefficient implies that technologies 
that are less prevalently utilized in the population of alliances are more likely to be 
coupled with another technology.  Taken together we view this as one way to possibly 
mitigate risk (exchange hazard) of an underlying technology. 
 Agreements signed where the lead product is in late stage clinical testing (defined 
as either Phase II or Phase III) are less likely to be associated with contracts that cover 
more than one technology.  The marginal effects on Late stage range from negative 0.33 
to negative 0.39.  This result is consistent with our expectations about later stage research 
since by the time a drug candidate moves into late stage clinical testing it is more focused 
and refined with respect to therapeutic category and underlying technology. 
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 We next consider the effect firm size and capabilities have, if any, on contractual 
complexity.  Interestingly, we find no effect of pharmaceutical firm size as measured by 
firm market capitalization, Pharma market cap.  Simply, the sheer size of a company 
does not appear to have an effect on the technological depth of a contract.  Capabilities, 
however, do matter.  We proxy pharmaceutical firm internal capabilities by Cohen and 
Levinthal’s (1989) measure of absorptive capacity defined as R&D expenditures divided 
by revenues, R&D intensity.  They postulate that a firm’s absorptive capacity is based on 
their own internal research and development efforts.  As a result, regardless of the 
external R&D activities, for example strategic alliances, that a company may engage in, 
the firm still must continue to pursue a comprehensive internal research program 
(Chesbrough, 2003).  We find a positive and significant effect on R&D intensity with 
marginal effects ranging from 0.0926 to 0.0976.  Higgins and Rodriguez (2006) show 
that R&D intensity has a positive influence on a pharmaceutical firm’s ability to engage 
in outsourcing acquisitions.  Our findings here suggest that in addition to helping dictate 
the ability of firms to engage in alliances and acquisitions, it also increases the 
probability that a specific alliance is technologically deep.  This finding complements the 
extant literature in that it suggests that firms that have the internal capability do not 
necessarily need to engage in large numbers of alliances, but rather can engage in a 
smaller number of more “deep” agreements. 
 The number of employees is a commonly used proxy to measure the size of a firm 
(e.g., Graham and Higgins, 2007; Rothaermel and Hess, 2007; Shan et al, 1994; Acs and 
Audretsch, 1989).  This measure is often used instead of market capitalization data since 
financial information about private companies is not always available.17  We find no 
impact between the number of employees of a biotechnology firm, Bio employees, and 
the probability that a given contract is technologically deep. 
 In addition to biotechnology firm size, in terms of the number of employees, we 
also examine the effect that firm financial resources, as measured by Bio shareholder 
equity, have on the ability to engage in complex agreements.  We find a positive and 
significant impact of biotechnology firm shareholder equity, Bio shareholder equity, on 
                                                 
17   BioScan often identifies the number of employees for private biotechnology firms.  This allows us to 
gather at least some information with respect to the size of the firm. 
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the probability of a technologically deep contract.  Marginal effects range from 0.0375 to 
0.0407 and are significant at the 10 percent level.  As with the pharmaceutical firms, here 
again, it appears that a biotechnology firm’s capabilities, proxied by their assets, are what 
matter with respect to being able to undertake more technologically deep contractual 
relationships.  These findings complement Lerner and Merges (1998) and Higgins 
(2007).  Firms in stronger financial position are not only able to negotiate from a stronger 
position, but these firms are also able to engage in more technologically deep 
relationships. 
 We find a positive and significant relationship between the presence of milestone 
payments, Milestone dummy, and the probability of a technologically deep contract.  
Marginal effects range from 0.1264 to 0.1767 and are significant at least at the 10 percent 
level.  We interpret the use of milestone payments as one way pharmaceutical firms are 
able to help mitigate potential moral hazard issues surrounding alliance agreements.  
Since research funds are fungible, theoretically, biotechnology firms could use research 
funds for other internal projects.  Milestone payments limit the financial exposure of the 
pharmaceutical firm while providing an incentive to the biotechnology firm to meet 
specific, verifiable research goals.  Jensen and Thursby (2001) find that royalties and 
equity are important in dealing with the moral hazard issue surrounding inventor effort.  
While neither Royalty dummy nor Equity dummy are significant, we believe milestone 
payments are acting in much the same way.18   
 Of the remaining independent variables only Alliance stock is significant, 
however it is only negative and significant in Model 2.  In further robustness testing, the 
variable remains unstable.  The negative coefficient suggests that as firms engage in 
larger numbers of alliances the probability that they are technologically deep diminishes.  
It would seem that these firms just simply engage in larger numbers of more “shallow” 
alliances.  The health of a pharmaceutical firm’s research pipeline, Score has been shown 
to impact the allocation of control rights (Higgins, 2007) and the probability that a firm 
                                                 
18   Jensen and Thursby (2001) focus on university license agreements and do not focus exclusively on the 
biopharmaceutical industry.  Arguably this research is much more basic and early stage as compared to the 
types of research being conducted at the biotechnology-pharmaceutical firm level.  As such, milestone 
payments seem much more useful in this case.  Many of the milestone payment provisions are tied to drug 
candidates passing various stages of clinical testing.  
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engages in an acquisition (Higgins and Rodriguez, 2006), however we find that it has no 
effect on the probability a firm engages in a technologically deep contract. 
      
4.2  Functional scope 
 
Table 5 presents probit estimates for our data regressing Functional scope on a 
series of indicator variables expected to affect the probability that a pharmaceutical firm 
enters functionally complex agreement.19  The dependent variable is an indicator yit that 
assumes a value of one for a given firm i in a specific year t if that firm enters in to an 
alliance that contains marketing, manufacturing and/or distribution provisions, and is zero 
otherwise.  Independent variables are the same as we utilized in Table 4.  Year dummies 
are included in all models.   
 By far the most important factor influencing the functional scope of a contract is 
the stage of the focal research.  The marginal effects for Late stage range from 0.3152 to 
0.4031 and are significant across all models at the 1 percent level.  This finding is not 
unexpected since focal products in later stages of clinical testing have a higher 
probability that they will reach FDA approval.  As a result, marketing, manufacturing and 
distribution rights become much more relevant.   
 In addition to the stage of the focal product, the overall size of the alliance, Size, 
tends to increase the probability that a contract is functionally broad.  Marginal effects 
range from 0.1124 to 0.1387 and are significant at the 1 percent level.  While it would 
appear that alliances dealing with later stage products would increase the overall size of 
the alliance, the simple correlation between Late stage and Size is only 0.1870.   
    Across all four models (Model 1 to Model 4), we find a negative and significant 
impact of Technology age on the probability that an alliance contract is functionally 
broad.  Marginal effects range from negative 0.2174 to negative 0.2716 and are all 
significant at the 1 percent level.  This suggests that newer technologies tend to be apart 
of contract agreements that focus more on research and development.  As these 
technologies are newer, it makes little sense for companies to negotiate marketing, 
manufacturing and/or distribution rights.  The effects on Technology count bolster this 
finding.  The negative coefficient implies that technologies that are less prevalently 
                                                 
19   Results remain robust when a logit model is considered. 
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utilized in the population of alliances are more likely to be functionally narrow.  Taken 
together this suggests that biotechnology firms have had some success in delaying the 
inclusion of these contractual terms.  The importance of this will be discussed below 
when we discuss the allocation of control rights. 
 Milestone payments which were demonstrated to be important for Technological 
scope are not important here (likewise, the presence of an equity stake, Equity dummy, 
has no effect).  However, the presence of royalty payments, Royalty dummy, do matter for 
functional scope.  The simple correlation between Royalty dummy and Functional scope 
is 0.2216 and marginal effects range from 0.1409 to 0.1861 and are significant at least at 
the 10 percent level.  We can infer that biotechnology firms appear to be more likely to 
negotiate for royalty payment terms for more functionally broad agreements.  Intuitively, 
this makes sense since the inclusion of marketing, manufacturing and distribution 
provisions may necessitate negotiations on royalty payments.     
   The proportion of research and development expenses committed to alliances as 
measured as a proportion of total research and development expenses, R&D payout, has a 
positive and significant impact on the probability that firms engage in functionally broad 
agreements.  Marginal effects range from 0.0617 to 0.0789 and are significant at least at 
the 5 percent level.  As pharmaceutical firms commit an ever increasing amount of their 
R&D budgets to external alliances, our finding suggest that the contractual landscape 
shifts in that the functional scope broadens.  This finding ties into overall contractual 
complexity, which will be discussed in the next section. 
 None of the remaining independent variables are significant across any of the 
specifications tested.  Unlike the previous results, neither firm capability nor size matter 
when considering the functional scope of the agreement.  Now that both Technological 
scope and Functional scope have been addressed individually we combine them and look 
at overall contract complexity. 
 
4.3   Contractual complexity 
 
As discussed above, the notion of contractual complexity has been studied 
elsewhere in the literature.  While each of these studies explores various definitions of 
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contractual complexity, no work that we are aware of defines complexity as we have here 
in a multi-dimensional framework.         
Table 6 presents both ordered probit (Model 1 to Model 4) and probit (Model 5 
and Model 6) estimates for our data regressing Complex I and Complex II, respectively, 
on a series of independent variables expected to affect the probability that a 
pharmaceutical firm enters a contractually complex agreement.20  The dependent variable 
in Model 1 to Model 4 is categorical ranking from one to four describing the complexity 
of the alliance along the previously discussed two dimensions.  The dependent variable in 
Model 5 and Model 6 is an indicator yit, that assumes a value of one for a given firm i in a 
specific year t if that firm enters in a strategic alliance that contains manufacturing and/or 
marketing provisions, and is zero otherwise.  Independent variables are same as those 
utilized in Table 4 and Table 5.  Year dummies are included in all models.   
The general proposition of transaction cost economics is that managers attempt to 
align the features of contractual relationships between firms in order to address issues of 
technological uncertainty, asset specificity and/or difficult performance measures 
(Williamson, 1985, 1991).  Pharmaceutical firms operate in an atmosphere of extreme 
technological and research uncertainty with often highly specialized assets.  As a result, 
alliance agreements between pharmaceutical and biotechnology firms tend to be rather 
detailed.  Additionally, most pharmaceutical firms engage in many alliances over time.  
For example, on average, firms in our sample engaged in approximately 122 alliances.  
This experience, both in general and through repeated contact with specific 
biotechnology partners leads firms to become more proficient at constructing agreements.  
However, there is a split in the extant literature with respect to whether contractual terms 
or the contracts themselves become more or less complex as firms engage in more and 
more alliances.  The potential financial loss to a firm if they are not contractually 
protected could potentially reach into the billions of dollars if a new drug is discovered.  
Given the value of the potential loss and significant uncertainty underlying the 
technological and scientific risks it would seem logical that contractual safeguards would 
increase (Williamson, 1985; Klein et al, 1978).  Ryall and Sampson (2006) find that 
                                                 
20   Results remain robust when an ordered logit and logit model is considered. 
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contracts are more complete or detailed when firms have prior alliances.  This suggests 
firms learn to craft more complex contracts as they gain experience. 
However, contrary to Williamson (1985) and Klein et al (1978), Parke (1993) and 
Ciccotello and Hornyak (2000) find some evidence of reduced contractual safeguards 
between firms engaging in repeated contacts.  Along with Gulati (1995) they attribute this 
to increased levels of trust.  Since the number of pharmaceutical firms that operate within 
a particular therapeutic category is relatively small, one would expect that the possibility 
of future relationships would prevent biotechnology firms from shirking or reneging on a 
contract.  Likewise, as Klein (1980) and Klein and Murphy (1997) discuss, firms with 
unequal bargaining power, in this case pharmaceutical firms, will also not act 
opportunistically as this could damage their reputation and limit their potential future 
alliance partners.     
 The coefficients on Alliance stock, across all models tested, is negative, but is 
only significant at the 10 percent level in Model 1.  Our results, as limited as they may 
be, seem to support Parke (1993) and Ciccotello and Hornyak (2000).  Contractual 
complexity tends to decline as alliance stock increases.  We generate a dummy variable, 
Prior, that equals one if the two firms had a prior alliance before the focal alliance.  
Models 1 to 6 in Table 6 were recomputed switching out Alliance stock with Prior.  
Results were similar to Alliance stock in that the coefficients were negative and 
significant at the 10 percent level, but not across all models.  Again, these results appear 
to support Parke (1993) and Ciccotello and Hornyak (2000).21  This finding is surprising 
given the extensive development times and high risk of failure coupled with the 
possibility of a significant financial payoff. 
 While cumulative experience appears to favor less complex agreements, alliance 
inexperience as measured by First alliance suggests that contracts are more complex if it 
is the biotechnology firm’s first alliance.  This finding is consistent with Williamson 
(1985) and Klein et al (1978) since the level of risk (or perceived risk) on behalf of the 
                                                 
21   The differences in these studies could be a function of the industries being studied or the definitions of 
contractual complexity that the various authors are using.  In addition, it may be the case that trust and 
related issues impact the contractual negotiation process and as a result is not observed in final outcome 
measures we are exploring here.  As such we can not distinguish between two possibilities: (1) trust related 
issues really do not impact underlying contract complexity in our sample or (2) trust related issues are 
influencing the contract process and we are just simply not detecting the effects with either of our 
measures.   We thank Steve Currall for drawing our attention to this distinction. 
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biotechnology company (and pharmaceutical firm) is relatively high; the biotechnology 
firm’s research performance is untested in the market.    
 Across all models and both specifications we find that the greater the resources of 
the biotechnology firm as measured by Bio shareholder equity, the more complex will be 
the contract.  The marginal effect in the probit specification in Model 6 is 0.0378 and is 
significant at the 10 percent level.  As a measure of firm resources, it seems consistent 
that as those resources increased contracts would begin to include manufacturing, for 
example, since some of the larger biotechnology firms have these capabilities. 
Interestingly, we find that the younger the technology, the more likely it is that the 
contract will be more complex.  The coefficients of Technology age are positive and 
significant across all specifications with marginal effects in Model 5 and Model 6 ranging 
between 0.3303 and 0.3753, respectively.  With such a new technology it is doubtful that 
the phase of the focal candidate is driving the result.  The correlation between 
Technology age and Late stage is negative 0.2955.  It might very well be the newness of 
the focal candidate that is the reason for the complex contract.  With new technologies 
the uncertainty of outcome is greater and it is possible that firms are simply trying to lock 
up downstream rights while they are less expensive.  Lerner et al (2003) show that when 
contracts get renegotiated, as they would in this case if the downstream rights were 
excluded, the terms received by the biotechnology firms improve. 
Complementing a technology’s age is how prevalent the technology has been with 
respect to its dispersion in the population of biopharmaceutical alliances.  We measure 
technology prevalence by Technology count and find that the more prevalent a given 
technology is in the population of alliances, the less complex the contractual agreement.  
The coefficient on Technology count is negative and significant across all specifications 
tested and the simple correlation between Technology count and Technology age is 
negative 0.3271. 
 One of the largest overall factors that predict the probability of a complex contract 
is the phase of the focal product.  The negative and significant on the coefficient is 
interpreted differently here in Table 6 than it was in Table 4 or Table 5.  Here in Table 6, 
recall the dependent variables are Complex I and Complex II.  Complex I is defined, as we 
discussed in Section 3.2, along a continuum.  The lower end of the continuum contains 
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agreements with one technology and a range of contractual breadths (functional scope).  
The upper end of the continuum contained agreements with technological depth.  
Complex II is a dummy that equals one if the contract is technologically deep (covering 
more than one technology).  As a result, the interpretation of the marginal effects in 
Model 5 and Model 6 (negative 0.3871 and negative 0.3922, respectively) suggest that as 
focal candidates move into later stages, they are focused on one technology and this 
simplicity is reflected upon in the underlying contracts.  Moreover, more complex 
agreements in earlier stages of development support the view that future contingencies 
are difficult to codify for research intensive firms (Robinson and Stuart, 2007). 
 Finally, the presence of a milestone payment, Milestone dummy, has a positive 
and significant impact on the probability of a contract being more complex.  We find no 
effect on complexity as a result of the presence of an equity stake, in contrast to Robinson 
and Stuart (2007), or the presence of a royalty payment.  Coefficients on Milestone 
dummy were positive and significant across all models and both specifications with 
marginal effects ranging from 0.1347 to 0.1722.  Milestones clearly are one way to help 
mitigate the risk and uncertainty associated with undertaking research across multiple 
technologies.  Additionally, milestones can be used as a way to mitigate some of the 
underlying moral hazard issues inherent in these relationships.  
 
4.4   Allocation of control rights 
 
Consistent with previous work (Lerner and Merges, 1998; Lerner et al, 2003; 
Lerner and Malmendier, 2004; Adegbesan and Higgins, 2007; Higgins, 2007), the total 
number of control rights allocated to the pharmaceutical firm is the dependent variable, 
Total rights.  This dependent variable is tested against various specifications of the same 
independent variables we utilized in the previously analyses with a few exceptions.  Since 
we are interested in contractual complexity we include our two component parts, 
Technological scope and Functional scope.  We include the individual components in the 
reported analysis so we can comment on which, if either, component may be driving the 
result.22   
                                                 
22   Our composite measure of contractual complexity is considered for robustness purposes. 
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Given the nature of the dependent variable we test for overdispersion in the data 
to determine whether a Poisson or negative binomial model is warranted.  We test for 
overdispersion utilizing a likelihood ratio test based on the Poisson and negative binomial 
distributions (Cameron and Trivedi, 1998).  This test tests the equality of the mean and 
the variance imposed by the Poisson distribution against the alternative that the variance 
exceeds the mean.  We reject the null hypothesis and as a result of overdispersion in our 
data we utilize a negative binomial model.  
Recall contractual complexity, as we define it, is a function of both Functional 
scope and Technological scope.  In terms of the allocation of control rights only 
Functional scope appears to matter.  Technological scope is positive but not significant at 
any reasonable level in any model tested.  This implies that the number of underlying 
technologies in an agreement has no effect on the allocation of control rights.  On the 
other hand, Functional scope is negative and significant with coefficients ranging from 
negative 0.1714 to negative 0.1825.  For those contracts that contain either marketing or 
manufacturing provisions, pharmaceutical firms concede focal rights to biotechnology 
firms.23  The natural question then becomes is do pharmaceutical firms use the focal 
rights to “pay” for marketing and/or manufacturing rights.  In order to test this hypothesis 
we construct a new variable Functional scope II.  Functional scope II is defined as a 
dummy that equals one if contract not only contains marketing, manufacturing or 
distribution provisions but those rights are allocated to the pharmaceutical firm.  When 
we replace Functional scope with Functional scope II and repeat Models 4 to 7 we obtain 
coefficients ranging from negative 0.2432 to negative 0.3374 that are significant at least 
at the 5 percent level.  As a result, we can reasonably argue that pharmaceutical firms 
“pay” for the marketing and/or manufacturing rights with the focal rights.  This finding is 
unique in that it shows that pharmaceutical firms are able to “trade” or “purchase” 
specific rights with other rights and not just financial terms, which we discuss below.24 
                                                 
23   Recall from Section 3.1 we define our focal rights under the headings of intellectual property rights, 
licensing rights and exit rights.  
24   This result allows us to indirectly observe firm preferences for specific control rights.  The extant 
literature, unfortunately, has only been able to observe ex post allocations of rights.  From this preferences 
can be inferred but what can not be determined is whether or not a firm preferred a specific right and as a 
result was willing to “pay” or “trade” other rights in order to obtain the right(s) that they preferred.  While 
we suffer from the same ex post allocation of rights, we are able to show that a “trade” or “payment” of 
rights occurred between the focal rights and marketing and/or manufacturing rights. 
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   We follow Higgins (2007) and measure the relative bargaining position of the 
pharmaceutical firm using a weighted measure of the firm’s research pipeline, Score.  
The rational behind the use of this measure is simple.  Pharmaceutical firms that have 
weak (or weakening) research pipeline portfolios are in a weakened bargaining position.  
As a result, biotechnology firms should be able to take advantage of this weakened 
bargaining position and obtain additional rights.  We find this to be the case across all 
models tested in Table 7.  The coefficients on Score are positive and significant ranging 
from 0.0740 to 0.0803.  Pharmaceutical firms that have healthier research pipelines are in 
a stronger negotiating position and as a result are able to extract rights from their 
biotechnology partners.  The converse is thus also true.  This finding is consistent with 
Higgins (2007).  Clearly, relative bargaining position of the pharmaceutical firm matters 
in the allocation of control rights.  
 Aghion and Bolton (1992), Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), Lerner et al (2003) and 
Higgins (2007) find that research projects in earlier stages of development, which are 
presumably those with larger information asymmetries and in greater need of financing, 
are associated with a transfer of control rights to the pharmaceutical firm.  The variable 
Late stage equals one if the lead product in the alliance is in Phase II or Phase III clinical 
testing.  Coefficients in Models 2 to Model 7 range from negative 0.1187 to negative 
0.2023 and are significant at least at the 10 percent level.  The direct interpretation of 
these coefficients imply pharmaceutical firms give up control rights to biotechnology 
firms for products in late-stage clinical testing.  The inverse interpretation is that rights 
are transferred to pharmaceutical firms for projects in earlier stages of development.  This 
finding is consistent with the aforementioned empirical work but is in contrast to the 
theoretical predictions of Aghion and Tirole (1994). 
We have already shown that pharmaceutical firms appear to be “trading” or 
“paying” for marketing and manufacturing rights with the focal rights being discussed.  
Now we consider whether firms are able to “pay” for additional rights with a variety of 
financial terms.  In order to determine this we focus on the effects of our direct financial 
incentives: Milestone dummy, Equity dummy, and Royalty dummy.  We also consider the 
overall size of the alliance, Size.  
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It appears that pharmaceutical firms are able to directly “pay” for additional 
control rights through the inclusion of milestone payments in the contracts.  This 
seemingly is a win-win for pharmaceutical firms since they not only obtain additional 
rights but milestone payments help alleviate some of the moral hazard problems inherent 
in this highly uncertain environment.  Since money is fungible biotechnology firms could 
possible use funds for other research purposes.  However, by linking financial rewards 
with scientific progress, pharmaceutical firms can keep biotechnology firm efforts 
focused on the alliance.  Coefficients on Milestone dummy range from 0.1361 to 0.1606 
and are significant at least at the 5 percent level across all models. 
Interestingly, the presence of an equity stake has a negative and significant impact 
on the number of rights allocated to the pharmaceutical firm.  This suggests that 
biotechnology firms are able to sell equity positions in their firm in order to garner 
additional focal control rights.  The in effect can buy additional rights using their firm as 
their currency of exchange.  
  The effect of the Size is minimal it is only significant in Model 1 and remains 
unstable and mostly not significant in robustness testing.  We believe that the negative 
relationship may be tied to the phase of the product which is the focus of the alliance.   
  Of the remaining variables none of them are significant across the various 
specifications tested.  We specifically discuss two sets of these variables given results in 
the extant literature.  First, for these groupings of contracts the availability of public (or 
private) financing has no significant effect on the allocation of rights.  Lerner et al (2003) 
and Higgins (2007) both report negative relationship between the availability of public 
financing, Bio IPO¸ and the allocation of rights.  Biotechnology firms are in a better 
bargaining position if they are not captive to the pharmaceutical firms for alliance 
financing.   
Second, we find no effect on Alliance stock on the allocation of rights.  
Furthermore, in robustness testing we find no effect on the presence of a prior alliance 
between the two firms that are the focus of the current alliance.  Consistent with our prior 
findings discussed in Section 4.3, we do not find that increased experience in either 
alliances or with a particular partner translates into any advantage or disadvantage with 
respect to the allocation of control rights.  Combined with the results in Section 4.3, it 
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appears that firms may very well learn to write “better” or more complete contracts, 
however, they do not appear to be anymore or less complex, in contrast to the findings of 
Ryall and Sampson (2006) nor does this experience appear to translate into additional 
control rights. 
 
5.0 Robustness 
 
 In order to ensure the robustness of the results to model selection the results from 
Tables 4, 5 and 6 are regenerated using a logit specification (and ordered logit in the case 
of Models 1 to 4 in Table 6).  None of the results presented are qualitatively different 
using either of these specifications. 
 We also want to ensure that our results are not sensitive to small changes in the 
underlying set of conditioning variables.  In order to determine if the results in Models 1 
to 4 in Table 6 and Models 1 to 7 in Table 7 are model dependent we borrow from the 
macroeconomics literature and implement Levine and Renelt’s (1992) version of 
Leamer’s (1983, 1985) extreme bound analysis (EBA).  In response to sensitivity issues, 
Leamer (1983, 1985) proposes an EBA to identify “robust” empirical relations.  For a 
specific variable of interest, the extreme bounds of the distribution of the associated 
coefficient estimates are calculated as the smallest and largest values that are not rejected 
at the 0.05 significance level given all possible combinations of the remaining 
conditioning variables taken 3 at a time. If the two bounds have differing signs, then the 
variable is labeled as fragile; otherwise it is labeled robust.  Of the 9 conditioning 
variables in Models 1 to 4 in Table 6 that are significant, all but two (Alliance stock and 
R&D payout) can be labeled robust.  Likewise, for the 7 variables that are significant in 
Table 7 all but two (R&D payout and Size) can be labeled robust.  As a result, we can be 
fairly confident that the results we present are not model dependent. 
 
6.0 Conclusion 
 
In this paper we attempt to bridge two literatures together and in doing so we 
make several contributions.  First, we extend the literature on contractual complexity by 
modeling complexity in a multi-dimensional framework.   This framework allows us to 
focus on both the functional scope and technological scope of an agreement.  We believe 
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this is one of the first studies to specifically control for and analyze the underlying 
technologies of an alliance agreement.  Second, we take our framework and analyze the 
determinants that increase the probability an alliance agreement will be more complex.  
Third, we tie the contractual complexity literature to the control rights literature by 
analyzing the relationship between contract structure and rights allocation.  Finally, we 
find that as a firm’s stock of alliances increases or if they have had prior relationships 
with a partner that contracts tend, on average, to be less complex.  Our focus on the 
biopharmaceutical industry makes these findings all the more interesting given long 
product development cycles (DiMasi, 2001) and potential significant payoffs within 
highly risky and uncertain environments.  
No research is without limitations.  We know from previous work that strategic 
alliances create shareholder value (Higgins, 2007; Chan et al, 1997; McConnell and 
Nantell, 1995).  Shareholder value in these studies was measured by cumulative abnormal 
returns (CARs) around the announcement of the alliance.  However, it can be argued that 
the market was responding to the announcement of the alliance and its future research 
prospects without full information of the underlying contract (in most cases the contract 
would not be publicly available at that time).  While the prospects of an alliance might be 
rewarding, the devil, as it is said, is in the details.  As Adegbesan and Higgins (2007) 
point out, it is how the underlying control rights are allocated in a contract that 
determines how a firm will benefit.  Our goal with this research has been to expose 
another layer in strategic alliance research, analyze underlying contracts and demonstrate 
that they matter.  By doing so, we believe, we have successfully linked the contractual 
complexity literature with the control rights literature.  The next evolution will be to 
address the question of how these contracts impact firm performance and shareholder 
value.  Doing so, we believe, requires a fine grain analysis of firm level alliance research 
data and mapping that to subsequent firm and shareholder performance.  We leave this 
task for future work.        
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Table 1: Variable List 
 
 
Variable Definition/Description
Score Weighted value (non-monetary) of pharmaceutical firm research
  pipeline, yeart-1
Functional scope Dummy = 1 if the contract included manufacturing and marketing
  provisions
Technological scope Dummy = 1 if the contract covers more than one technology
Total rights Total number of rights allocated to pharmaceutical firm
  (out of 8 possible rights)
Complex I Categorical ranking from one to four describing the complexity of
  of the alliance contract along two dimensions
Complex II Dummy = 1 if contract is Complex I equals "3" or "4"
Revenues Pharmaceutical revenues (millions of 1999 dollars)
R&D expenditures Pharmaceutical R&D expenditures (millions of 1999 dollars)
R&D intensity Pharmaceutical R&D expenditures/sales (millions of 1999 dollars)
Pharma market cap Market capitalization of pharmaceutical firm (millions of 1999 dollars) 
Bio employees Total number of biotechnology firm employees (thousands), yeart
Bio shareholder equity Biotechnology firm shareholder equity in the year of the alliance 
  (millions of 1999 dollars)
First alliance Dummy = 1 if the alliance was the first for the biotechnology firm
Bio IPO Amount of money raised in public equity markets by biotechnology
  firms in the year prior to an alliance (millions of 1999 dollars)
R&D payout Pharmaceutical firm external R&D expenditures/total R&D expenditures
  (millions of 1999 dollars)
Size Total value of the alliance (millions of 1999 dollars)
Late stage Dummy = 1 if lead product that is focus of alliance is in Phase II or 
  Phase III clinical testing
 
Technology age Dummy = 1 if difference between year of the contract and year of first
  alliance in population for the focal technology is less than or equal to
  5 years
Technology count Number of alliances in population within the focal technology that have
  been initiated until the focal alliance
Alliance stock Total number of prior pharmaceutical alliances until the year before the 
  alliance, yeart-1
Milestone dummy Dummy = 1 if milestone payments are present in the alliance contract
Equity dummy Dummy = 1 if a non-controlling equity position was present in the
  alliance contract
Royalty dummy Dummy = 1 if running royalty payments are identified in the alliance
  contract  
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
Variable Mean Median
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum
Score 168.91 124.40 156.43 11.60 824.40
Functional scope (%) 0.30 0.00 1.00
Technological scope (%) 0.33 0.00 1.00
Total rights 3.18 3.00 1.34 0.00 8.00
Complex I 1.96 2.00 0.95 1.00 4.00
Revenues ($) 11146.55 9236.80 8491.40 8.72 40363.20
R&D expenditures ($) 1186.87 1189.50 819.83 5.25 4435.00
Pharma market cap ($) 49570.51 37519.00 45191.26 99.57 216049.00
Bio employees 0.470 0.137 2.24 0.002 28.10
Bio shareholder equity($) 139.64 27.28 582.38 0.80 6119.00
First alliance (%) 0.06 0.00 1.00
Bio IPO ($) 4673.22 4200.00 2055.05 900.00 8500.00
R&D payout (%) 0.08 0.04 0.11 0.00 0.47
Size ($) 57.64 37.50 81.41 0.50 815.00
Late stage (%) 0.22 0.00 1.00
Technology age 0.22 0.00 1.00
Technology count 214.34 120.00 221.90 0.00 881.00
Alliance stock 121.87 88.00 113.60 1.00 551.00
Milestone dummy (%) 0.54 0.00 1.00
Equity dummy (%) 0.51 0.00 1.00
Royalty dummy (%) 0.44 0.00 1.00
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Table 3: Correlation Matrix 
 
 
 
 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
1. Score 1.0000
2. Functional scope -0.0361 1.0000
3. Technological scope -0.0779 -0.2057 1.0000
4. Total rights 0.1190 -0.2374 0.1256 1.0000
5. Complex I -0.0938 0.2803 0.2817 0.0088 1.0000
6. R&D intensity -0.0384 -0.0646 0.0981 0.0516 0.0651 1.0000
7. Pharma market cap 0.4000 0.0195 -0.0623 0.0093 -0.0517 -0.2313 1.0000
8. Bio employees 0.0381 -0.0814 -0.0477 -0.0533 -0.0860 0.0054 0.0293 1.0000
9. Bio shareholder equity 0.0399 -0.0605 -0.0345 -0.0635 -0.0629 0.0475 -0.0382 0.7904 1.0000
10. First alliance -0.0881 0.1181 0.0545 0.0108 0.1104 -0.0175 -0.0491 -0.0413 -0.0468 1.0000
11. Bio IPO 0.2517 -0.0272 -0.0226 -0.0062 -0.0353 0.0551 0.3879 0.0572 0.0664 0.0388 1.0000
12. R&D payout 0.0215 0.0405 0.1840 -0.0413 0.2000 -0.0477 0.1357 -0.0379 -0.0881 -0.1126 -0.1739 1.0000
13.Size 0.2232 0.2046 0.0280 -0.0551 0.1261 -0.0357 0.1923 0.0650 0.1346 -0.0639 0.1254 0.0443 1.0000
14. Late stage 0.0327 0.3885 -0.3369 -0.1997 -0.1432 -0.0553 0.0482 0.0797 0.0708 -0.0071 0.0360 -0.1030 0.1870 1.0000
15. Technology age -0.1539 -0.1938 0.3658 0.0783 0.2654 -0.0330 -0.1523 0.0046 0.0356 0.0599 -0.2173 0.2888 -0.1139 -0.2955 1.0000
16. Technology count 0.1344 0.0252 -0.1854 -0.0034 -0.1698 -0.0057 0.2078 0.2118 0.1584 -0.0102 0.1653 -0.0771 0.2344 0.2025 -0.3271 1.0000
17. Alliance stock 0.4727 -0.0725 -0.1124 0.0956 -0.1452 -0.0698 0.5297 0.0338 0.0664 -0.0864 0.2567 0.0002 0.1888 -0.0050 -0.2593 0.2583 1.0000
18. Milestone dummy 0.0294 0.2697 0.0852 0.0879 0.2136 0.0461 0.0446 -0.0755 -0.1168 0.0521 0.0337 0.0685 0.2015 0.2126 -0.0645 0.1691 -0.0114 1.0000
19. Equity dummy -0.1169 0.1296 0.0118 -0.1891 0.0727 -0.0958 -0.1409 -0.1401 -0.1383 0.1056 -0.0715 -0.0419 0.1168 0.0541 0.0210 -0.0791 -0.0444 0.0906 1.0000
20. Royalty dummy -0.1004 0.2216 0.0026 -0.0639 0.1093 -0.0897 -0.0800 -0.1145 -0.1156 0.0952 -0.0993 0.0744 -0.1231 0.1272 0.0894 -0.0369 0.0232 0.3254 0.0954 1.0000
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Table 4: Technology Scope Regression Analysis 
 
Model 1 ∂F/∂x Model2 ∂F/∂x Model 3 ∂F/∂x Model 4 ∂F/∂x
Score -0.1278 -0.1645 -0.1582
(0.1430) (0.1534) (0.1605)
R&D intensity 0.2921b 0.0976 0.2359 0.2864c 0.0926 0.3152
(0.1442) (0.1513) (0.1511) (0.2328)
Pharma market cap 0.0388 0.1028 0.0967 0.0159
(0.1025) (0.0978) (0.0923) (0.1285)
Bio employees -0.1028 -0.0348
(0.0876) (0.0600)
Bio shareholder equity 0.1322c 0.0407 0.1172c 0.0378 0.1201c 0.0375
(0.0710) (0.0678) (0.0692)
First alliance 0.4437 0.3989
(0.4442) (0.4665)
Bio IPO 0.0584 0.2985 0.4497
(0.3860) (0.3390) (0.4179)
R&D payout 0.0672 0.0891
(0.0838) (0.0979)
Size 0.1347 0.0869 0.1132
(0.1202) (0.1212) (0.1333)
Late stage -1.665a -0.3820 -1.9465a -0.3796 -1.4436a -0.3347 -1.9933a -0.3939
(0.3795) (0.4377) (0.3861) (0.4775)
Technology age 1.0573a 0.3867 1.0906a 0.3835 1.0921a 0.3934 1.0535a 0.3729
(0.2683) (0.2907) (0.2874) (0.2990)
Technology count -0.0014b -0.0004 -0.0011b -0.0003 -0.0014b -0.0004
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0006)
Alliance stock -0.0016 -0.0025c -0.0007 -0.0013 -0.0023
(0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0014)
Milestone dummy 0.3841c 0.1264 0.5816b 0.1742 0.5586b 0.1767 0.5385b 0.1645
(0.2306) (0.2400) (0.2311) (0.2635)
Equity dummy 0.0701 -0.0082
(0.2225) (0.2627)
Royalty dummy -0.1819 0.0858
(0.2507) (0.2936)
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y
N 220 200 207 190
Wald χ2 60.57 61.38 56.97 57.48
Psuedo R2 0.2437 0.2962 0.2377 0.3000
a,b, and c represent signficance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively
*  constant term was included in each regression but was excluded from the table due to space considerations
** we use White (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors in all regressions.    
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Table 5: Functional Scope Regression Analysis 
 
 
Model 1 ∂F/∂x Model2 ∂F/∂x Model 3 ∂F/∂x Model 4 ∂F/∂x
Score 0.0508 0.0008
(0.1504) (0.1523)
R&D intensity -0.0503 0.0850 0.1273
(0.1567) (0.1525) (0.1423)
Pharma market cap 0.0204 0.1251 0.0161 0.1049
(0.1018) (0.1137) (0.0883) (0.1149)
Bio employees -0.7126 -0.5360
(0.5771) (0.5919)
Bio shareholder equity 0.105 0.0723 0.1108
(0.1071) (0.0754) (0.1082)
First alliance 0.8318
(0.6803)
Bio IPO -0.2134 -0.2619 -0.3999
(0.5470) (0.5078) (0.5969)
R&D payout 0.2327a 0.0707 0.2241b 0.0617 0.2479b 0.0789 0.2575b 0.0731
(0.0953) (0.1011) (0.0982) (0.1055)
Size 0.4564a 0.1387 0.4083a 0.1124 0.4327a 0.1227
(0.1285) (0.1197) (0.1208)
Late stage 0.9119a 0.3152 1.0198a 0.3323 1.1289a 0.4031 1.0812a 0.3605
(0.2633) (0.2786) (0.2545) (0.2908)
Technology age -1.2001a -0.2716 -1.0578a -0.2174 -0.8456a -0.2201 -1.0891a -0.2313
(0.3405) (0.3341) (0.3119) (0.3394)
Technology count -0.0007 -0.0010c -0.0002 -0.0006 -0.0010c -0.0002
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0006)
Alliance stock -0.0019 -0.0021 -0.0021
(0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0015)
Milestone dummy 0.2793
(0.2308)
Equity dummy -0.0519
(0.2427)
Royalty dummy 0.4556c 0.1409 0.6605b 0.1861 0.5629a 0.1817 0.6181b 0.1789
(0.2578) (0.2699) (0.2201) (0.2753)
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y
N 216 216 203 190
Wald χ2 73.94 58.25 58.85 60.00
Psuedo R2 0.3308 0.3162 0.2482 0.3390
a,b, and c represent signficance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively
*  constant term was included in each regression but was excluded from the table due to space considerations
** we use White (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors in all regressions.    
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Table 6: Contractual Complexity Regression Analysis 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 ∂F/∂x Model 6 ∂F/∂x
Score -0.0576 -0.0385 -0.0047 -0.0469 -0.1402 -0.1615
(0.1093) (0.1148) (0.0878) (0.0941) (0.1444) (0.1602)
R&D intensity 0.1131 0.1698 0.2969c 0.0969 0.3142
(0.0787) (0.1091) (0.1646) (0.2282)
Pharma market cap -0.0112 0.0057 -0.0575 -0.0421 0.0260 0.0162
(0.0701) (0.0690) (0.0683) (0.0725) (0.1055) (0.1229)
Bio employees -0.1092 -0.0590 -0.0386
(0.0722) (0.0386) (0.0587)
Bio shareholder equity 0.1200b 0.1130b 0.1290b 0.1210c 0.0378
(0.0595) (0.3843) (0.0590) (0.0686)
First alliance 0.7776b 0.6365c 0.6555 0.3998
(0.3741) (0.3843) (0.4239) (0.4645)
Bio IPO -0.0736 -0.1412 0.1461 0.4101
(0.3362) (0.2786) (0.3737) (0.3690)
R&D payout 0.1167c 0.1284c 0.1180c 0.0714 0.0907
(0.0674) (0.0741) (0.0723) (0.0850) (0.0979)
Size 0.2871a 0.2098c 0.2117b 0.1992c 0.1915c 0.0626 0.1676c 0.0334
(0.0957) (0.0949) (0.0968) (0.1042) (0.1047) (0.1002)
Late stage -0.4406b -0.4610b -0.4314b -0.4133c -1.8020a -0.3871 -1.9751a -0.3922
(0.1990) (0.2096) (0.2058) (0.2157) (0.3970) (0.4646)
Technology age 0.4895b 0.6441a 0.5787b 0.6311a 0.9161a 0.3303 1.0597a 0.3753
(0.2337) (0.2466) (0.2389) (0.2358) (0.2751) (0.2991)
Technology count -0.0010a -0.0011b -0.0015a -0.0013a -0.0013b -0.0004 -0.0014b -0.0004
(0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0006)
Alliance stock -0.0017c -0.0015 -0.0016 -0.0021
(0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0012) (0.0013)
Milestone dummy 0.4011b 0.5800a 0.6065a 0.5409a 0.4201c 0.1347 0.5641b 0.1722
(0.1911) (0.1884) (0.1829) (0.2004) (0.2318) (0.2435)
Equity dummy 0.0331 0.0492 0.0074
(0.1696) (0.1776) (0.2296)
Royalty dummy 0.0303 0.1245 -0.1531
(0.1867) (0.2006) (0.2532)
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
N 220 203 203 203 220 203
Wald χ2 57.06 50.15 55.71 65.57 65.36 57.9
Psuedo R2 0.1045 0.1184 0.1233 0.1283 0.2618 0.2996
a,b, and c represent signficance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively
*  constant term was included in each regression but was excluded from the table due to space considerations
** we use White (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors in all regressions.    
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Table 7: Control Rights Regression Analysis 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Score 0.0798b 0.0803b 0.0776b 0.0801b 0.0799b 0.0740c 0.0767b
(0.0397) (0.0410) (0.0383) (0.0388) (0.0391) (0.0390) (0.0391)
R&D intensity 0.0067 -0.0116 -0.0047 -0.0024 -0.0014 -0.0044 -0.0054
(0.0321) (0.0344) (0.0369) (0.0306) (0.0305) (0.0305) (0.0304)
Pharma market cap -0.0124 -0.0161 -0.0265 -0.0147 -0.0149 -0.0242 -0.0248
(0.0276) (0.0283) (0.0271) (0.0263) (0.0262) (0.0279) (0.0280)
Bio employees -0.0142 -0.0119 -0.0153 -0.0156 -0.0152 -0.0154
(0.0119) (0.0138) (0.0124) (0.0125) (0.0125) (0.0123)
Bio shareholder equity -0.0390
(0.0263)
Functional scope -0.1825b -0.1796b -0.1714b -0.1784b
(0.0724) (0.0728) (0.0718) (0.0717)
Technological scope 0.0637 0.0552 0.0587 0.0574
(0.0621) (0.0646) (0.0644) (0.0646)
Bio IPO 0.0916 0.1093 -0.0611 0.0500 0.0583 0.0351 0.0434
(0.0939) (0.0868) (0.0739) (0.0877) (0.0890) (0.0920) (0.0888)
R&D payout -0.0400 -0.0512c -0.0351 -0.0419 -0.0437c -0.0463c -0.0447c
(0.0272) (0.0270) (0.0265) (0.0264) (0.0270) (0.0269) (0.0269)
Size -0.0556b -0.0416 -0.0329
(0.0275) (0.0289) (0.0284)
Late stage -0.2023b -0.2235a -0.1187c -0.1336c -0.1782c -0.1455c
(0.0820) (0.0803) (0.0708) (0.0701) (0.0782) (0.0780)
Technology age 0.0931 0.0982 0.0358 0.0508 0.0459
(0.0739) (0.0719) (0.0772) (0.0772) (0.0775)
Technology count 0.0040
(0.0100)
Alliance stock 0.0003 0.0002
(0.0002) (0.0002)
Milestone dummy 0.1398b 0.1606a 0.1597a 0.1361b 0.1367b 0.1461b 0.1447b
(0.0641) (0.0607) (0.0572) (0.0595) (0.0595) (0.0614) (0.0615)
Equity dummy -0.1119c -0.1128c -0.1407b -0.1278b -0.1275b -0.1351b -0.1375b
(0.0601) (0.0584) (0.0581) (0.0537) (0.0537) (0.0540) (0.0541)
Royalty dummy -0.0606 -0.0395 -0.0114 -0.0135 -0.0308 -0.0317
(0.0662) (0.0658) (0.0622) (0.0622) (0.0653) (0.0656)
N 203 203 203 203 203 203 203
Wald χ2 40.28 59.40 49.34 55.50 55.46 56.18 57.95
a,b, and c represent signficance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively
*  constant term was included in each regression but was excluded from the table due to space considerations
** year fixed effects were included in all models  
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Fig 1.  Presents our multi-dimensional framework for contract complexity in a two-by-two matrix.  
Functional scope is defined as low if the alliance agreement focuses solely on research and development 
and contains only our focal rights.  Functional scope is defined as high if the agreements include provisions 
dealing with marketing, manufacturing and distribution.  Technological scope is defined as low if the 
agreement focuses on one technology while it is defined as high if more than one technology is involved. 
 
  
